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A SPECIAL ISSUE QUANDARY -

SUBMITTING

"PARTIAL INCAPACITY" IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
by James H. Wallenstein
Texas' uniquely rigid regulation of jury verdicts has been the subject
of much debate since its inception! Particularly vulnerable is the frequent
occurrence of totally incongruous elements within a single verdict. In
workmen's compensation suits, for example, juries have returned verdicts
(1) finding the claimant partially incapacitated but awarding no monetary
recovery,' or (2) finding the claimant both partially incapacitated and
totally incapacitated at the same time.' The inexperienced logician pulls
his hair in frustration. Most lawyers, however, try to operate at maximum
efficiency under the rules of the game. 4 This Comment will analyze conflicts in special issue submission, particularly as they relate to recovery
for partial incapacity under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law.
In conclusion it will recommend special issues designed both to reduce
conflicts and to represent accurately the concept of partial incapacity.
I.

CONFLICT IN

JURY VERDICTS: CAUSES AND JUDICIAL RECONCILIATION

Causes At least one philosophical view restricts the jury's function to deciding only the facts of the controversy, leaving all issues of law and all
consequences resulting from the facts to the judge.' The Texas special
issue system attempts to enforce this restriction. Issues which are too
"general"-which come too close to asking for a single ruling on the outcome of the case-may be rejected without request from either party,"
and the admission of such issues in the face of a proper objection is re'Pro: Gooch, Submission to the jury, 18 TEXAS B.J. 155 (1955); Con: Stout, Our Special
Issue System, 36 TEXAS L. REV. 44 (1957). For a law review dialogue, see Green, Blindfolding the
jury (Part II), 33 TEXAS L. REv. 273 (1955) (including an authoritative history of special verdicts in the United States and specifically in Texas) ; Gay, "Blindfolding" the Jury: Another View,
34 TEXAS L. REV. 368, 377 (1956); Green, A Rebuttal, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 382 (1956); Gay,
A Rejoinder, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 514, 516 (1956); Green, A Reply to Mr. Gay's Rejoinder, 34
TEXAS L. REV. 681, 685 (1956). For a summary distinction and analysis of both general charges
and special issues, see Masterson, Preparation and Submission of Special Issues in Texas, 6 Sw. L.J.
163, 163-64 (1952). Non-Texas authorities are listed in VanDercreek, Annual Survey of Texas
Law-Texas Civil Procedure, 21 Sw. L.J. 155, 167 n.56 (1967).
2
Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d 605 (1961), 13 BAYLOR
L. REv. 245, 252 (1961), 40 TEXAS L. REV. 591 (1962); Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v.
Craik, 162 Tex. 260, 346 S.W.2d 830 (1961), 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 245, 253. See also Barrow,
Conflicts in jury Findings, 26 TEXAS B.J. 23, 80-81 (1963). See notes 73-86 infra and accompanying text.
'The latest case is Insurance Co. of No. America v. Brown, 394 SW.2d 787 (Tex. 1965). See
notes 72-108 infra and accompanying text.
' The State Bar of Texas has encouraged both plaintiff-oriented and defendant-oriented lawyers
to learn the rules. See Kronzer, Special Issues, Definitions, Instructions, and Objections, in PERand Shirley, Special Issue Submission From a
SONAL INJURY LITIGATION IN TEXAS 732 (1961)
Defense View, in PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION IN TEXAS 775 (1961).
' For an extensive and well-documented study of this area see Judge Jerome Frank's opinion in
Skidmore v. Baltimore, 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948). See also I MCCORMICK & RAY, TEXAS LAW
os EVIDENCE §§ 1-9 (2d ed. 1956); Green, Blindfolding the jury, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 273 (1955).
'TEx. R. Civ. P. 277, 279.
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versible error." Instead, the jury must receive separate issues concerning
each vital factual element in dispute and must be expressly advised not
to consider the effect of its answers.8 Unfortunately, although this system
may reduce the effect of juror sympathy or prejudice,' the abundance of
written material presented to the jury is a breeding ground for abuse of
semantics, legal jargon, and the kitchen-sink technique.
Moreover, the confusion is augmented by a problem which necessarily
flows from the system itself. In order to insure equal consideration by the
jury of both the plaintiff's and the defendant's argument, under Texas
rules each party is entitled to an unconditional submission of his case. 0
To be sure, a defendant may not restate in the negative his opponent's
issues,1' but, provided he has laid the proper predicate in his pleadings"
and presentation of evidence," he may submit issues (1) which can result in a favorable judgment irrespective of the answers to his opponent's
issues" and (2) which by inference may rebut one or more of his opponent's issues. The distinction between a mere negative restatement and an
inferential rebuttal is often difficult to determine" and perhaps is not even
'See 3 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.04, at 1058 (1950, as supplemented in 1967):
"No case has been found, decided since 1913, where the trial judge refused to give a special issue
charge after timely request and was sustained upon appeal." For a survey by the Texas Supreme
Court concerning what issues are too general, see Barclay v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., 387
S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1965) (disallowing the issue "proper control," with two concurring opinions in
substantial disagreement). See also Pope, Broad and Narrow Issues, 26 TEXAS B.J. 921 (1963)
(pointing out inconsistencies in labelling issues too "general" between negligence and non-negligence
controversies).
'TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a (effective Jan. 1, 1967) (specifically part III, § 4, at 2 TEx. R. Csv.
P. ANN. 365 (1967)). See also Amarillo v. Huddleston, 137 Tex. 226, 152 S.W.2d 1088, 1090
(1941); Monkey Grip Rubber Co. v. Walton, 122 Tex. 185, 53 S.W.2d 770, 772-73 (1932). For
a detailed analysis of the rule see, in this issue, Comment, Jury Misconduct in Personal Injury Litigation in Texas-A Need for Further Reform, at note 64.
'However, a juror can and does consider the effect of his verdict. Pope, The Mental Operations
of Jurors, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 849, 855-56 (1962). Query: Does the special issue system rely on
laboratory conditions of a disinterested, ignorant juror? The juror's mental process is considered,
in connection with jury misconduct, in this issue. Comment, supra note 8, text accompanying
notes 40-48, 110-16.
'0TEx. R. Civ. P. 277; Barclay v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., 387 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex.
1965), 21 Sw. L.J. 155, 164 (1967); Fox v. Dallas Hotel, 111 Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517, 521-22
(1922); Smith v. Chase, 405 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e., 21 Sw.
L.J. 155, 164 (1967).
"Ross v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 153 Tex. 276, 267 S.W.2d 541 (1954); Wright v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 172, 123 S.W.2d 314, 316-17 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939)
adopted; Eckert-Fair Constr. Co. v. Flabiano, 342 S.W.2d 629, 633-34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)
error ref. n.r.e.
"TTEx. R. Civ. P. 277, 279. See alsoRodriquez v. Zavala, 279 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955); Goldman v. Campbell, 249 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
Although a general denial may be sufficient
to allow submission of evidence, it is not sufficient to
allow submission of a specialissueeven though the evidence is adequate to raise such an issue.
Parker v. Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry., 401 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Safety Cas. Co.
v. Teets, 195 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref.
"TEx. R. Civ. P. 279. Salley v. Black, Sivalls
& Bryson, 225 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949) error dismissed; Cawthon v. Cochell, 121 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)
error dismissed.
14Professor Masterson called such a defense "confession and avoidance." Masterson, Preparation
and Submission of Special Issues in Texas, 6 Sw. L.J. 163, 176 (1952). Most pleas of "confession
and avoidance" are listed as "affirmative defenses." TEX. R. CIv. P. 94. And many must be verified
by affidavit. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93.
153 McDoNALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.10, at 1073 n.81 (1950), citing among others, Le
Beau v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 143 Tex. 589, 187 S.W.2d 73, 74 (1945) and Southern Underwriters v. Wheeler, 132 Tex. 350, 123 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939) adopted.
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logically defensible.' However, courts have accepted the task of separating
the "opposite" from the "contrary" 1 and generally have been lenient in
allowing the submission of inferential-rebuttal issues when properly
i
plead. 8
The defendant's inferential-rebuttal issue will not support a judgment
when the finding to the plaintiff's rebutted issue is contrary.' On the
other hand, it must be submitted independently, i.e., the right to jury
consideration may not be conditioned on a negative (or affirmative) answer to the plaintiff's issue which it rebuts.' What can and often does
result is a conflict in the verdict, which, if irreconcilable, prevents the
rendering of any judgment." The right to object to such conflict is not
waived by failure of either or both parties to do so before discharge of
the jury-even when the trial judge has warned the parties of possible
waiver.2' It is generally considered to be waived when not raised in the
motion for new trial, although there is some authority holding its mere
existence to be fundamental error." If alerted to the conflict, the trial
(1950), quoting SCHILLER,
193 McDoNALD, TEXAS CIvIL PRACTICE § 12.10, at 1074 n.82
FORMAL LOGIC 163 (1912): "Hardly any logician of repute will nowadays contend that these
formal manipulations of symbols represent actual thinking."
17Wright v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 172, 123 S.W.2d 314, 316-17 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1939) adopted.
"8At least two authorities agreed that the plaintiff has a heavy burden to show that a defendant's issue is "opposite" to his own. Masterson, supra note 14, at 179 (quoting Mr. Clayton
Orn).
"Professor Hodges points out that since inferential-rebuttal issues are evidentiary, they cannot
even support a judgment standing alone. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS 41 (1959).

"0State v. Schlick, 142 Tex. 410, 179 S.W.2d 246, 248 (1944), quoted in Hughes v. Belman,
200 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e. Schuhmacher Co. v. Holcomb, 142
Tex. 332, 177 S.W.2d 951, 953 (1944), quoted in Simpson v. Barham, 292 S.W.2d 874, 881
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
1 See, e.g., the cases listed in 57 TEx. JUR. 2d Trial § 550-51 (1964). For discussion of three
recent cases of importance see VanDercreek, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Texas Civil Procedure,
21 Sw. L.J. 155, 164-65 (1967).
"Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985, 991 (1949) cited
for authority on this point in, among others, L. & L. Industrial Prods. Inc. v. Albert E. Kuehnert,
Auctioneers, Inc., 404 S.W.2d 324, 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. and Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brown, 309 S.W.2d 295, 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.'r.e.
23 Interpretation and extension of the waiver issue in Little Rock. has not been consistent. The
Texas Supreme Court in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murphee, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d
744, 748-49 (1962), when no assignment of error was made at the motion for new trial, cited
Little Rock but then stated: "The entry of judgment by a trial court on conflicting findings does
not constitute fundamental error. See Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979; McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265. The passage was quoted
in Huff v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 394 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref.
n.r.e. See also Lewis v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 151 Tex. 95, 246 S.W.2d 599, 601 (1952)quoted in State v. Wilemon, 393 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. 1965) and in Wilkerson v. Darrogh & Lyda,
Inc., 408 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.-which indicates a limiting of
the Little Rock rule.
But see Brooks v. Moreland, 404 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966): "We believe there
is a conflict of issues here within the rule of . . . [Little Rock], which is also authority for holding
that this is one of fundamental error which we must consider even though not raised." Although
the Brooks case cited no further authority, see Kilgore v. Howe, 204 S.W.2d 1005, 1007 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947). Siratt v. Worth Constr. Co., 263 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) quoted
the Kilgore opinion and added that Little Rock was "to the same effect." The case was reversed
by the Texas Supreme Court, Siratt v. Worth Constr. Co., 154 Tex. 84, 273 S.W.2d 615 (1954),
but that court did not discuss the Kilgore language and, in reversing the case on the point that the
issues did not conflict, indicated by inference that error would have been preserved despite lack of
timely objection.
For a bit more analysis and case authority, see Comment, Waiver of Unanswered and Conflicting Special Issues, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 93, 102 (1959).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

I[Vol. 21

judge must send the jury back to reconsider the verdict, and, if resolution is unobtainable, or if the jury has already been dismissed, he must
declare a mistrial."
Because many conflicts are not resolved before dismissal of the jury,
they greatly impede justice by delaying the final settlement of cases.
Moreover, resolution upon jury reconsideration does not necessarily insure a just result. A conflict is, in one sense, merely a symptom of jury
confusion; the resolution of conflict may well remove the symptom without curing the confusion.
Judicial Resolution' Just as practitioners have learned to work within
the special issue framework, so also the courts have developed means of
alleviating conflicts through various forms of special-issue qualitative
analysis. Despite occasional reassurances that all issues are to be given
equal weight, 9 courts often compare the answers in a jury verdict and
thus reconcile apparent conflicts. Three broad and quite general premises

pervade all analysis: (1) courts look to the verdict as a whole rather than
to individual segments; 7 (2) they assume that the jury did not intend to
create a conflict;"8 and (3) they attempt to reconcile apparent conflicts

when reasonably possible."
In the most effective form of qualitative analysis the judge weighs the
conflicting issues in comparison with the judgment itself. If, by alternately
striking each of the conflicting issues, the conflict is shown not to be

vital to the judgment, it will be disregarded. In Little Rock Furniture
Mfg. Corp. v. Dunnf a personal injury suit involving an automobile
accident, the jury found, in answer to the defendant's contributory negli-

gence issues, that the plaintiff had failed to keep proper lookout but that
such failure was not negligence."1 Since failure to keep proper lookout had

been defined in the charge to include negligence, the two answers conflicted. However, the jury had left unanswered the issue asking whether
24TEx.

R. Civ. P. 295. The judge's functions are stated in detail at 3 McDONALD, TEXAS

CIVIL PRACTICE § 15.03 (1950) and 57 TEX. JuR. 2d Trial §§ 553-55 (1964). See also note 112
infra and accompanying text.
2
" See 3 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 15.06 (1950); 57 TEX. JUR. 2d Trial % 549-57
(1964); Barrow, Conflicts in Jury Findings, 26 TEXAS B.J. 23 (1963); Miller, "Irreconcilable"
Conflicts in Special Issue Jury Verdicts, 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 71 (1961); Note, 15 Sw. L.J. 460
(1961); Note, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 671 (1961).
" When issues are held to be conflicting, courts may espouse "equal importance" or "equal
weight" to all findings. See, e.g., Continental Nat'l Bank v. Hall-Page Tire Co., 318 S.W.2d 127,
129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). Notes 27-44 infra and accompanying text should dispel ideas that
Such slogans are followed consistently.
27Perkins v. Mitchell, 153 Tex. 368, 268 S.W.2d 907, 909 (1954), quoting Ford v. Carpenter,
147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 558, 562 (1949); State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731, 739
(1941); Dobbins v. Gardner, 402 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
sTraywick v. Goodrich, 364 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Tex. 1963), quoting Casualty Underwriters
v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939) adopted.
"Iln addition to the cases cited in notes 27 and 28 supra, see Billingsley v. Southern Pac. Co.,

400 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. and cases cited therein; Wanda
Petroleum Co. v. Reeves, 385 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) and cases cited therein.
s 1 4 8 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985 (1949). See Barrow, Conflicts in Jury Findings, 26 TEXAS
B.J. 23, 24 (1963); Comment, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 93, 95, 102 (1959); and authorities cited in note
4 supra.
21The latter issue was superfluous because "proper lookout" was defined to include negligence,
but no objection had been raised to its submission.
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the plaintiff's failure to keep a proper lookout was a proximate cause of
the accident (a fact vital in establishing the plaintiff's contributory negligence). The Texas Supreme Court found that, although the issues were
conflicting, the conflict was not fatal to the plaintiff's cause; the defendant
had not sustained the burden of proving proximate cause.
The court quoted directly from two prior supreme court decisions"
what has since, interestingly enough, been referred to as the Little Rock
"judgment test" for determining whether conflicting issues preclude a
judgment:
The test in such case is, whether taking the finding alone in one instance,
a judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff; and taking it alone
in the other, judgment should be entered in favor of the defendant.33

In the Little Rock situation, whether accepting as conclusive the proper
lookout issue or the negligence issue, the court still would have to deny
the defense of contributory negligence. Thus no fatal conflict existed.
The "judgment test" was itself tested eleven years later in Bradford v.
Arhelger.' Although the jury had found that both the defendant and
the plaintiff were guilty of negligence and that the negligence of each
was a proximate cause of the collision, it also had found that the collision
was a result of an unavoidable accident. " The supreme court, by a fiveto-four majority, held that a fatal conflict existed. It emphasized that
even though no combination of answers would support a judgment for
the plaintiff, single elimination could create one combination where neither
party could achieve a judgment." Through the Bradford case the scope
of fatal conflicts was expanded to include situations where one combination of answers results in judgment for one party and another combination
results in a fatal conflict. To date Bradford has been cited in eleven
" The original language was stated in Howard v. Howard, 102 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937) error 'ref. It was quoted by the supreme court in Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64,
183 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1944) and by courts of appeals in Goss v. Longview Hilton Hotel Co., 183
S.W.2d 998, 999 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) and Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Welch, 154 S.W.2d
896, 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
aa Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985, 991 (1949),
quoted in Freeman v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 317 S.W.2d 563, 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)
error ref. n.r.e. and countless other cases. In Pooler v. Klobassa, 413 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967) the court refers to "the rule laid down in Little Rock .... " See also Barrow, Conflicts
in jury Findings, 26 TEXAS B.J. 23, 24, 76 (1963). In one recent case, Potter v. Garner, 407
S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e., the judge evidently did a bit more homework and thus acknowledged Little Rock, Pearson, and Howard.
34 1 6 1 Tex. 427, 340 S.W.2d 772 (1960), 15 Sw. L.J. 460 (1961), 24 TEXAS B.J. 164 (1961).
as The trial judge had instructed the jury that a finding of "unavoidable accident" excludes
negligence of either party as a proximate cause of the accident.
' Bradford v. Arhelger, 161 Tex. 427, 340 S.W.2d 772, 773 (1960). "We are confronted with
two conflicts-a conflict between the finding of unavoidable accident and the finding that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries, and a conflict between the finding of
unavoidable accident and the finding that the plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the
injury." The court was able to resolve the first conflict through the "judgment test" process, but
as to the second conflict it concluded:
If we disregard the finding that the plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of
the collision and consider the rest of the verdict, we are left with findings that the
defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision and that the collision
was an unavoidable accident. . . . Such findings are themselves in fatal conflict and
will not support a judgment.
The dissent argued that only two issues were controlling, the negligence-contributory negligence
issue and the unavoidable accident issue, and that the defendant had won both.
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cases, but it has substantially affected the outcome in only two--both
cases concerning partial incapacity. 7
When conflicts cannot be reconciled through applying the "judgment
test," courts may utilize other forms of special issue qualitative analysis
in which the conflicting issues are weighed against each other. Stated
summarily, a finding which is characterized as "specific," 3 s "ultimate,"'
or "material"'" will often supersede a conflicting finding which is characterized respectively as "general," "evidentiary," or "immaterial." Standards for such tests are more vague than the analytical "judgment test"
and perhaps could even be termed "personal judgment" tests.41 Moreover,
semantical problems plague any set of standards in which a "specific"
issue overshadows a broader "general" issue and yet an "ultimate" issue
overshadows a narrower "evidentiary" issue. The courts appear to be
establishing a spectrum of special issue values. On one end, "immaterial"
issues seek answers which do not further the outcome of the case. At
the other end, "general" issues ask the jury to decide the case. Issues at
either extreme may be only arguably admissible;" therefore, when they
" Insurance Co. of No. America v. Brown, 394 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1965) (the court relied
on Bradford to defeat the plaintiff's claim that the conflict was not fatal under Little Rock). See
note 104 infra and accompanying text. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 347 S.W.2d
605, 607 (Tex. 1961) (the court, in finding fatal conflict, cited Bradford instead of Little Rock).
See text accompanying note 85 infra. Seven cases have cited both Little Rock and Bradford in
declaring no conflict: Dobbins v. Gardner, 402 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.; Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jones, 398 S.W.2d 577, 582-83 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966) error ref. n.r.e.; Howell v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry., 380 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) error ref. n.r.e.; Vouras v. 3525 Turtle Creek, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e.; Gray v. L-M Chevrolet Co., 368 S.W.2d 861, 866-67 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e. In one case, with facts similar to Bradford, the court cited Bradford
alone but then found no conflict. Jackson v. Clark, 351 S.W.2d 292, 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)
error ref. n.r.e. The one remaining case found a conflict and cited both Little Rock and Bradford.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Massie, 387 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e.
a"Barclay v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., 387 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. 1965), 21 Sw. L.J.
155, 164 (1967), quoted in Smith v. Chase, 405 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
ref. n.r.e., 21 Sw. L.J. 155, 164 (1967). See also Vouras v. 3525 Turtle Creek, Inc., 369 S.W.2d
819, 822 (1963) error ref. n.r.e., citing authorities. But cf., Pon Lip Chew v. Gilliland, 398
S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1965) (especially Justice Hamilton's dissent at 103); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry.
v. Shelton, 383 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.y.e.; Christie v. Tipps,
279 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
aSmith v. Chase, 405 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r'.e., 21 Sw. L.J.
155, 164 (1967), citing Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1952) (which, at
615, deals indirectly with the point). See also Bueche v. Eickenroht, 220 S.W.2d 911, 913-14
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949); State Nat'l Bank v. Woodfin, 146 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940)
error ref.
4
Pure Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Exchange Bank & Trust Co., 408 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966), rev'd on substantive grounds, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 431 (1967) and cases cited
therein; Smith v. Chase, 405 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e., and cases
cited therein; Vouras v. 3525 Turtle Creek, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)
error ref. n.r.e., and case cited therein. See also 4 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE, § 17.30,
at 1407 (1950).
4 "These rules clearly give ample room for metaphysical exercise." 3 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL
PRACTICE § 15.06, at 1275 (1950). Pages 1274-77 present the tests and describe certain unpredictable results.
I In 1963 Justice Jack Pope, then on the San Antonio Court of Appeals, explained the
admissibility of "broad issues" in non-negligence cases and listed several "broad issues" admissible
even in negligence cases: damages, res ipsa loquitur, attractive nuisance, discovered peril, proper
lookout, and proper control. Pope, Broad and Narrow Issues, 26 TEXAS B.J. 921, 979-81 (1963).
In 1965 the Texas Supreme Court withdrew "proper control" from the list. Barclay v. C. C. Pitts
Sand & Gravel Co., 387 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1965), 21 Sw. L.J. 155, 164 (1967). Justice Pope
expressed his disapproval in concurring, as did Justice Norvell.
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are admitted and thus cause conflict, judges discard them. " Between the
two extremes courts prefer issues which are vital to the ultimate outcome
of the case and probably give them slight preference in special issue reconciliation."
II.

THE PERPLEXING CONCEPT OF PARTIAL INCAPACITY

Workmen's compensation laws protect an employee against a loss of
wage earning capacity.' The legislatures could have eased the task of
measuring such loss by making conclusive the differential in wages earned
before and after an injury, but this relatively objective procedure would
not have adequately compensated those who by necessity struggled
through their former chores after an injury. The Texas act, though based
on the subjective standard of capacity, does provide objective guideposts.
Injuries to specific parts of the body are compensated uniformly by an
express statutory schedule" (which may or may not exclude recovery
under the "general" injury provisions)."7 And general injuries are expressly
distinguished as creating either partial" or total49 incapacity and as being
either temporary or permanent in time.'
Recovery for partial and for total loss of wage earning capacity is
regulated by different statutory sections which, for the same period of time,
are mutually exclusive."' Thus, the special issue requesting a finding on
" This was, in effect, Justice Pope's argument in Barclay: "The opinion of the Court of Civil
Appeals was right when it gave effect to the specific jury findings over the finding on proper
control. That is settled law." 387 S.W.2d at 653. See also Smith v. Chase, 405 S.W.2d 450,
453-54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e., 21 Sw. L.J. 155, 164 (1967).
"For an example of the problems involved in such determination, see analysis of C & R
Transp., Inc. v. Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1966) in VanDercreek, Annual Survey of Texas
Law-Texas Civil Procedure, 21 Sw. L.J. 155, 165 (1967).
'The act compensates for loss of earning capacity rather than for loss of actual earning or for
the injury itself. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d 605, 606
(1961); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Clack, 134 Tex. 151, 132 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1939) adopted; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Drummond, 114 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938) error ref.; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Stevens, 55 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error
ref. See also 63 TEx. JuR. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 139 (1965) and authority cited
therein.
46TEx REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (1967); Comment, 12 Sw. L.J. 100, 106-15
(1958).
" Specific injuries which result solely in loss of certain faculties or of various members of
the body (or of total loss of use of that member) enumerated in § 12 cannot be measured
by the general injury provisions. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brownlee, 152 Tex. 247, 256
S.W.2d 76, 77-79 (1953), quoted in part in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dooley, 410 S.W.2d 314,
319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). However, the award for total and permanent loss of certain vital
faculties or members (or total and permanent loss of use thereof) is measured as if the claimant
were 100 per cent totally and permanently incapacitated. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306,
§ la (1967). Moreover, for other specific losses which are not enumerated in § 12 the claimant
may prove that his injuries resulted in permanent, total incapacity. Ibid. See 63 TEx. JUR. 2d
Workmen's
Compensation § 147-54 (1965); Comment, 12 Sw. L.J. 100, 106-15 (1958).
48
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, 5 11 (1967). See also Comment, Partial Incapacity
Under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, 12 Sw. L.J. 100 (1958); Legislation Note, 9
BAYLOR L. REV. 358
4

(1957).

TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 10 (1967). See also Akin, Annual Survey of Texas
Law-Workmen's Compensation, 21 Sw. L.J. 75, 83-84 (1967).
' Since maximum periods of recovery are listed in each section "permanent" incapacity has a
different meaning in weeks for each type of incapacity.
"' Insurance Co. of No. America v. Brown, 394 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. 1965); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Phelan, 103 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) mentioned in Liberty
Universal Ins. Co. v. Gill, 401 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
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partial incapacity can be submitted not only by the claimant as an alternative ground of recovery " but also by the defendant as an inferential rebuttal to total incapacity. If requested, the issue of partial incapacity
must be submitted and must not be conditioned on a negative response
to the issue of total incapacity."
As might be predicted from its dual purpose, the issue of partial incapacity is a hybrid, difficult to define and thus an almost incorrigible
cause of conflicts in jury verdicts. Each word is misleading. The noun
"capacity" can be related to functions other than earning a livelihood.
But under the act a claimant is incapacitated only to the extent of his
earning capacity." Concerning the adjective "partial," students of geometry learn that the whole includes all of its parts. Under the act,
however, partial incapacity directly conflicts with total incapacity. The
substantive concept is further clouded by its statutory standard of measurement, comparing wages before the injury to wage earning capacity
during incapacity." Unfortunately, the jury, although prodded by careful
instructions, often misses these distinctions. The resulting conflicts are
somewhat unusual since a finding of partial incapacity can conflict not
only the "total incapacity," but also with the measure of recovery.
A. "Incapacity" Without Recovery
When the jury confuses compensable incapacity with pure physical
incapacity and/or ignores an employee's need to earn money despite incapacity, it may return a verdict finding the claimant partially incapacitated but at the same time possessing a wage earning capacity equal to
his average weekly wage before the injury. The labyrinth of semantical
difficulties thus involved must be analyzed in context with the legislative
and judicial history concerning "wages" and "wage earning capacity."
Compensation for general partial incapacity is calculated as "sixty per
cent (60%o) of the difference between his (the injured employee's) average
weekly wages before the injury and his average weekly wage earning
capacity during the existence of such partial incapacity."57 However, prior
to 1957 most appellate courts allowed, as an alternative to the express
statutory formula, computations of recovery obtained by multiplying a
" Of course, because the claimant prefers recovery for total incapacity, his issue on partial
incapacity will always be conditioned on a negative finding to the issue of total.
5
Wright v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 172, 123 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1939) adopted, cited for a related point in Liberty Universal Ins. Co. v. Gill, 401 S.W.2d 339, 343
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. But see Stone v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 154 Tex. 21,
273 S.W.2d 59 (1954), holding that the issue of partial incapacity can be conditioned on a finding
that the claimant's total incapacity was temporary. The Stone case to date has been cited only five
times, only once on point, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Collins, 290 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956) (attempting to expand the doctrine to make irrelevant a finding of partial incapacity
following findings of total permanent incapacity), rev'd, 156 Tex. 376, 295 S.W.2d 902 (1956).
For a suspicious view on Stone, see PEERY, TEXAS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PROCEDURE 34-35
(1960).
S4See note 45 supra.
a5 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 8306, § 11 (1967).
" For an example of the Bradford test as it applies to partial incapacity cases, see Insurance Co.
of No. America v. Brown, 394 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1965).
" TEx. REV. Csv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 11 (1967). (Emphasis added.)
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jury-found percentage of disability times the average weekly wages before the injury. This alternative perhaps developed from a mistaken association of general partial incapacity with specific partial incapacity."8
(The recovery provision for specific partial incapacity requires the percentage approach. 9) However, even after the two sections could be distinguished, most courts approved the percentage computation when dealing with general partial incapacity-and until 1940, without any express
rationale except occasional citations of previous cases." Presumably, most
courts, including the supreme court,"1 believed the alternative methods
to be indistinguishable in effect. In 1940 one case stated just that,"' but
by that time the trend was too deeply entrenched to need justification.
No court stated the necessary underlying premise, that wages and wage
earning capacity before the injury were equivalents (or were so similar
that to submit issues comparing wages and wage earning capacity would be
unduly burdensome to the jury). Only with the terms equal could recovery measured by a percentage of wages accurately represent recovery
measured by the remainder of the respective wages minus wage earning
capacity." Nevertheless, although a few courts insisted on compliance64
with the statutory means of computation and many courts expressly pre" Authority cited in note 47 supra indicates the possibility for confusion. The historical
development and relationship of terms was first explained in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Moreno, 277 S.W. 84 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925) adopted.
55
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (1967).
" The following decisions, in chronological order, contain no reasoning and cite no authority
for the admission of a percentage special issue: General Acc. & Life Assur. Corp. v. Bundren, 274
S.W. 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), aff'd, 283 S.W. 491, 494 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926) adopted;
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shilling, 289 S.W. 996, 998 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927) adopted;
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Crow, 16 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Siller v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 93 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error dismissed. Added to that
list is SPEER, SPECIAL ISSUES 790 (1931).
The following decisions contain no reasoning and cite only the previous cases listed or cases
included in the following list itself: Petroleum Cas. Co. v. Lewis, 63 S.W.2d 1066 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) error ref.; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Bronton, 70 S.W.2d 780, 785-86 (Tex Civ. App. 1934)
error dismissed (cites only Bronton and discusses only the issue of commenting on the weight
of evidence); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 123 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)
error dismissed; Associated Indem. Corp. v. McGrew, 142 S.W.2d 567, 569, 573-74 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940), aff'd, 160 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942) adopted.
" The Bundren, Shilling, Lewis, and McGrew cases, supra note 60, bear supreme court approval.
62
Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Price, 145 S.W.2d 951, 958 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error
dismissed, judgment correct.
" The validity of this statement can be proved algebraically.
W = wages before the injury
WEC = wage earning capacity before the injury
C = wage earning capacity after the injury
p = percentage of original wage earning capacity remaining after the
injury (p = C/WEC)
P = percentage incapacity caused by the injury (P + p = 100% = 1.00)
Statutory formula for computing recovery: W - C = recovery
Pre-1957 case formula for computing recovery: (W) (P) = recovery
Assuming recovery to be constant:
W-c= (W)(P)
C
W-(W) (P)
C
(1.00 - P) (W) = (p) (W) = (C/WEC) (W)
(WEC/C) (C) = W
WEC - W
64
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Swain, 278 S.W.2d 600, 604-05 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)
error ref. n.r.e. (both quoting the statute and giving reasons for following the statute); Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 94 S.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (giving no reasons).
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ferred it," most agreed that a trial judge could even refuse a requested
issue based on the statutory requirements in favor of an issue concerning
percentage incapacity."
In 1957 the Texas Legislature added the following sentence to the provision defining recovery: "Compensation for all partial incapacity result-

ing from a general injury shall be computed in the manner provided in
this Section, and shall not be computed on a basis of a percentage of dis-

ability." The amendment settled all doubt concerning computation of
recovery in favor of the prior minority view, and for two years only its
retroactive effect was in question."7 But imposing upon the jury the responsibility of distinguishing average weekly wages from average weekly
wage earning capacity has sadistic overtones, and at least one jury in
19596' and two juries in 196069 were snared in this apple-orange trap.
In 1959 the Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals"0 examined a jury verdict
which included a finding of partial incapacity but also a finding that
average weekly wage earning capacity after the injury was equal to a
stipulated average weekly wage before the injury. Of course this verdict
would have allowed no recovery despite the finding of partial incapacity.
The trial judge had declared a mistrial because of fatal conflict in the
special issues, and the defendant sought a writ of mandamus to render
judgment on the verdict. In upholding the trial judge the court of civil
appeals cited no authority to support its finding of a conflict but based
its finding solely on the definition of "partial incapacity" given to the
jury. 1 Under the terms of that definition a finding of "a depreciation
or reduction in . . . [the claimant's] ability to work and earn money"
5
" Scarborough v. Travelers Ins. Co., 189 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Reed, 150 S.W.2d 858, 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dismissed, judgment
correct; Lloyds Cas. Co. v. Meredith, 63 S.W.2d 1051, 1054 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
" Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Brasher, 234 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref.
n.r.e.; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Spivey, 231 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error 'ef.
n.r.e., 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 476; Associated Indem. Corp. v. McGrew, 142 S.W.2d 567, 569, 573-74
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940), affd, 160 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942) adopted. See also
the cases cited in note 56 supra, although in most of these cases the insurance company had not
requested an alternate issue; Comment, 12 Sw. L.J. 100, 100-03 (1958); Legislative Note, 9

BAYLOR L. REV. 358 (1957).

"'Reviewing a decision concerning a 1949 injury, the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals held the
following: (1) the amendment is not retroactive, and (2) the law prior to 1957 allowed a percentage computation. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Vineyard, 340 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960) error ref. n.r.e. See also Martin v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 339 S.W.2d 413, 414-15
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Martin, 347
S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1961), in which the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals in a suit involving a 1956
injury, did not mention the 1957 amendment and ruled the statutory issue irrelevant following a
finding of percentage disability.
"SFidelity & Cas. Co. v. Stephenson, 325 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See notes
70-72, 86 infra and accompanying text.
9
" Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d 605 (1961), 13 BAYLOR
L. REV. 245, 252 (1961), 40 TEXAS L. REV. 591 (1962); Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v.
Craik, 162 Tex. 260, 346 S.W.2d 830 (1961), 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 245, 253. See also Barrow,
Conflicts in Jury Findings, 26 TEXAS B.J. 23, 80-81 (1963). See notes 73-86 infra and accompanying text.
7
"Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Stephenson, 325 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
71 By the term 'partial incapacity' or 'partial incapacitated,' wherever it appears in
this charge is meant: Where an employee by reason of an injury sustained in the
course of his employment is only able to perform part of his regular labor, or a less
remunerative class that he performed prior to his injury, whereby he suffers a
depreciation or reduction in his ability to work and earn money.
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was a necessary element. The court did not consider whether such depreciation or reduction could be read into the verdict as it stood. If the
claimant's earning capacity before the injury had been higher than his
wages, a depreciation in capacity could reduce it to a figure equal to
pre-injury wages." Through its silence the court indicated its retention
of the pre-1957 assumption that pre-injury wages are conclusive of preinjury wage earning capacity.
Verdicts similar to that of the preceding case were returned by two
juries in 1960. Again in both, judgment on the verdict would have allowed
no recovery despite a finding of partial incapacity. The trial judges
ordered mistrials, and the defendants brought original mandamus proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court. The two cases, Indemnity Ins. Co.

of North America v. Craik" and Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland,"4 are monumental because of their discussions of both the substantive
law of partial incapacity and procedural law of special issues. Amidst dissenting and concurring opinions the court granted relief (held the issues
to be reconcilable) in Craik and denied relief (held the issues to be irreconcilable) in Holland-seemingly because of one arguably distinguishable
term and a comma blunder."
The verdict in Holland was certainly irreconcilable by the pre-1957
implied presumption that wages and wage earning capacity were equivalents. But if wages before the injury should now be considered only an
inconclusive representation of wage earning capacity before the injury,
both the Holland and Craik verdicts might be viewed as consistent. However, five members of the supreme court considered the philosophy of the
act (to award recovery for loss of earning capacity) superior to a literal
reading of its terms. In declaring irreconcilable conflict and thus upholding the trial judge, the court indicated that, despite the 1957 statutory
mandate to measure incapacity in the prescribed manner, wages before
an injury were still to be considered equivalent to wage earning capacity
at that time.7"
The dissents in Holland emphasized that since wages during incapacity
are not determinative of earning capacity after the injury," wages before an injury should not be determinative of earning capacity before an
" This argument was later advanced by Justices Greenhill and Smith in their dissenting opinions
in Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 347 S.W.2d 605, 607, 610 (1961). No case authority
was cited by either justice.
7 162 Tex. 260,

346 S.W.2d

830

supra note 69, at 80-81 .
74 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d 605

(1961),
(1961),

13 BAYLOR
13

L.

BAYLOR L.

REV. 245,

253.

REV. 245, 252

See also Barrow,
(1961),

40 TEXAS

L. REV. 591 (1962). See also Barrow, supra note 69, at 80-81.
75 See notes 79-82, 86 infra and accompanying text.
" In order to uphold the purpose of the act, stated Chief Justice Calvert for the majority in
Holland, "necessarily average weekly wages before injury must represent, in law, earning capacity
before injury." 347 S.W.2d at 606. (Emphasis in original.)
7 See Justice Greenhill's dissent in

Holland, id. at 607, citing Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.

Frankum, 145 Tex. 658, 201 S.W.2d 800, 802 (1947).

Justice Smith's dissent in Holland, 347

S.W.2d at 610, cites Smith v. Consolidated Cas. Ins. Co., 290 S.W.2d 589, 591-92 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956) error ref. n.r.e. For a thorough analysis of the area, see Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Shawver, 375

S.W.2d 510, 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e. For a discussion of recent cases see Akin,
Annual Survey of Texas Law-Workman's Compensation, 21 Sw. L.J. 75, 83-84 (1967).
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injury.' They argued that, while wages may often "represent" earnings,
to use the two as absolute equivalents would rob the 1957 amendment
of any effect.
Although the majority in the two cases refused to accept the dissent's
logical, if somewhat mechanical, interpretation of the statute, it did adopt
its own mechanical analysis of special issues. As mentioned previously,
the Little Rock "judgment test" and the Bradford modification have developed objective criteria for reconciling special issues.7" Language in the
Craik decision perhaps outdoes both former authorities in objectivity.
In Craik. the trial court's instruction of "partial disability" was as follows:
By the term 'partial disability' is meant disability less than total where an
employee, by reason of injuries sustained in the course of his employment,
is only able to perform part of the usual tasks of a workman, but, nevertheless, he is able to procure and retain employment reasonably suitable to
his physical condition and ability to work, or he is only able to perform labor
of a less remunerative class than he performed prior to his injury whereby he
5
suffers a depreciation or deduction in his earning capacity."

In this instruction the clause "whereby he suffers a depreciation or deduction in his earning capacity" through absence of a preceding comma,
applied to only the latter of two disjunctive definitions of "partial disability." (In Holland a comma had preceded that clause thus making it
applicable to both definitions."') The instruction in Craik would thus
allow the claimant to be partially disabled without suffering a loss of
earning capacity. Emphasizing this grammatical reconciliation of the
issues-and by negative implication indicating a new legal distinction
between "incapacity" and "disability'-the court granted mandamus
and ordered judgment entered for the defendant.
Holland and Craik have been treated lightly as the "comma cases," but
See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 30-37 supra and accompanying text.
80346 S.W.2d at 831. (Emphasis added.) This definition was approved in Southern Underwriters v. Schoolcraft, 138 Tex. 323, 158 S.W.2d 991 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942) adopted. In
Craik, however, it was suggested to be less accurate than the Holland instruction. See note 83
infra and accompanying text.
st It shall mean where an employee by reason of injuries sustained in the course of his
employment is only able to perform part of the usual task of a workman, but
nevertheless, is able to procure and retain employment reasonably suitable to his
physical condition and ability to work or is only able to perform labor of a less
remunerative class than he performed prior to his injuries, whereby he suffers a
depression or reduction in his earning capacity.
347 S.W.2d at 606. (Emphasis added.)
"*Compare the following statement in Holland, 347 S.W.2d at 606 (where the trial court used
the term "incapacity"): "It is quite clear from the foregoing language of the Workman's Compensation Act that partial incapacity cannot exist unless the average weekly wage earning capacity
after injury is less than average weekly wages before injury." (Emphasis added.) with the
following statement in Craik, 346 S.W.2d at 831-32 (where the trial court used the term
"disability"): "Under the definition, the jury was authorized to find partial disability . . . even
though he [the claimant] had suffered no depreciation in his earning capacity." Before the 1957
amendment to § 11 the two terms had been considered equivalents. See authority cited in
Martin v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 339 S.W.2d 413, 414-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Martin, 347 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1961).
See alsoSuperior Lloyds of America v. Foxworth, 178 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
error ref. w.o.m.
78

79

1967]

COMMENTS

they contain important statements on both the substantive law of workmen's compensation and the procedural law of special issues. First, the
court in Craik indicated its preference for the Holland definition of partial incapacity, compelling a corollary finding of loss of earning capacity."3 Secondly, the court expressly stated that a monetary award must
accompany such finding to prevent conflict. Both statements seem proper
in giving the claimant the benefit of the doubt as to how a verdict like
that in Holland arose. Quite probably in such situations the jury has
adopted post-injury wages as the measure of wage earning capacity after
the injury, disregarding the element of necessity peculiar to post-injury
employment. Such confusion is highly prejudicial to the claimant's case.
To be sure, the verdict may also be caused by an improper substitution
of physical incapacity for wage earning capacity. However, this confusion, detrimental to the defendant before the 1957 amendment," cannot prejudice his case under the post-1957 measurement of recovery."
Since juror confusion, as a practical matter, can be harmful to only the
claimant, interpreting the statutory section on partial incapacity to precipitate conflict in Holland situations seems necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the act.
Secondly, the court in Craik showed its commitment to an objective
test of special issue reconciliation. In Holland the Bradford decision, not
Little Rock, was cited for authority. Of course Holland like Bradford
involved the finding of a conflict whereas in Little Rock potential conflict was resolved. But perhaps another reason exists for the Holland decision's being one of two decisions citing Bradford and ignoring Little
Rock. Perhaps the court wished to emphasize that the two disjunctive
segments in the instruction of partial incapacity or partial disability must
be kept separate. (As mentioned previously, a question in Bradford was
whether the separate issues of defendant's negligence should be considered
as one matter in dispute. The majority in Bradford insisted on keeping
the issues separate, thus recognizing conflict in a verdict containing
affirmative answers to not only the issues of primary negligence and
contributory negligence but also the issue of unavoidable accident.) Under
rigid adherence to this objective, grammatical test the Craik verdict contains no irreconcilable conflict. And in this respect the supreme court's
companion cases are consistent with each other and with the 1959 Beau83

346 S.W.2d at 832.
litigation involving pre-1957 injuries insurance companies

84In

instead of claimants often

appealed judgments rendered on conflicting verdicts. See, e.g., Lloyds Cas. Co. v. Meredith, 63
S.W.2d 1051 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) where the jury found the following: (1) 50 per cent
partial incapacity, (2) wages before the injury, $50, (3) wage earning capacity after the injury,
$15. The trial court, following the percentage computations of recovery, ignored the third issue
and rendered judgment on the first two. The court of civil appeals reversed in favor of the
insurance company, holding the finding of 50 per cent disability to be immaterial. See also cases
cited in notes 60-66 supra.
" Since 1957 a vital element in determining recovery is wage earning capacity after the injury.
The inclusion of this term prevents a monetary reward based on juror confusion mentioned in
the above text. In other words the juror can still find the claimant "incapacitated" when he has
not suffered a loss in wage earning capacity, but it can award him no money.
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mont decision." That the supreme court, under mandamus standards,
ordered a trial judge to reverse his decision because of sentence construction, indicates that special issue objectivity in reducing conflicts must
supersede both trial court discretion and substantive considerations.
B. "Partial" Incapacity With Total Recovery
Just as jurors often return findings of incapacity without loss in earning
capacity, so do they find partial incapacity with one hundred per cent
loss of earning capacity or with a concurrent grant of total incapacity.
The problem stems from the juror's failure both to limit "capacity" to
earning capacity and to find "total" and "partial" mutually exclusive.
Interpreting special issue verdicts in this area is especially difficult since
the "judgment test" does not apply literally, i.e., under either partial
or total incapacity the insurance company is liable. Potential conflict concerns only the extent of the recovery allowed.
Before 1940 numerous cases were decided in Texas courts of civil appeals
in which both partial and total incapacity were granted by the jury.
Several courts indicated that since affirmative findings of both conditions
are technically inconsistent, any verdict containing them presents irreconcilable conflict." In most cases, in addition to the technical inconsistency
a monetary discrepancy existed because the claimant had received a judgment of total incapacity larger than the amount allowable under a partial
incapacity verdict. However, in 1937 in Traders & General Ins. Co. v.
Woods' the jury had awarded both total incapacity for 300 weeks and
100 per cent partial incapacity for 300 weeks. Although the trial court
granted a judgment of "total incapacity for a period of 300 weeks," this
resulted in the same money judgment as if the judgment had been for 100
per cent partial incapacity for 300 weeks. That is, because recovery for
partial incapacity was then measured by the percentage loss of capacity
(here 100 per cent, the same as for total) and because the statute allows
recovery for partial incapacity up to 300 weeks 9 (here the exact length of
time awarded), no monetary discrepancy could have existed between recovery for partial and total incapacity. Nevertheless, the court, quoting
liberally from a contemporary case in which both technical and monetary
86See notes 70-72 suPra and accompanying text. This precedence of special issue reconciliation
over other matters is reminiscent of a famous supreme court case, Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex.
64, 183 S.W.2d 453 (1944). In the "Jensen Case" segment of the decision, id. at 457, the court
considered (1) a jury finding of adverse possession for a period of ten years continuously after
1911 and before April, 1939, (2) a jury finding of non-adverse possession from 1911 to 1924,
(3) conclusive evidence that if possession was non-adverse before 1924, it was non-adverse after
1924. The court first reconciled the two issues and then discarded the second issue-which was
supported
by evidence unless the pre-1924 possession was established as non-adverse.
8
1Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holtzclaw, 111 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error
dismissed; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Milliken, 110 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (dicta);
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Woods, 103 S.W.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Phelan, 103 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Reeves, 300 S.W. 206, 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
S'103 S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
9
1 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 11 (1957).
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conflicts existed, 0 concluded: "no cited authority extant . . . supports the
trial court's holding of no irreconcilable conflict in this jury's quoted
answers."91
The Woods case is important in light of the same appellate court's decision in Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. McLaughlin," decided
the same year. At the trial the jury had found that the injury had resulted,
prior to trial (fifty-nine weeks after the injury), in both 111 weeks
temporary total incapacity and 75 per cent permanent partial incapacity.
On the basis of this verdict, the trial court had awarded recovery for only
permanent partial incapacity. The court of civil appeals summarily distinguished Woods and approved a subjective test, treating the verdict as
a whole and rationalizing the intent of the jury to find 111 weeks total

followed by permanent partial." This subjective test, seemingly at the
other end of the spectrum from the technical test, had in fact been approved by various other courts, including one in which writ of error was
refused. 5 In fact, considering the history of such a test and the McLaughlin
decision, the language and holding in Woods seem incongruous. Nevertheless, the court maintained that it was merely distinguishing its former
case.
In 1940 the Texas Supreme Court, reviewing McLaughlin, rejected both
technical and subjective extremes and, nine years before the decision in
Little Rock, accepted a modified "judgment test."" Allowing only the
75 per cent permanent partial, the supreme court stated the following rule:
[W]e think that conflicting findings should not be held to destroy each
other except to the extent of the conflict. Only to that extent could such
findings possibly destroy each other.'
"Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Phelan, 103 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). The jury
had found total permanent incapacity and partial permanent incapacity with 100 per cent loss
of earning capacity. The trial court had awarded recovery for 401 weeks, longer than the
maximum period allowable for partial incapacity.
" 103 S.W.2d at 1060.
92i06 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), aff'd, 137 Tex. 613, 135 S.W.2d 955 (1940).
9 106 S.W.2d at 818. The claimant on appeal had not claimed a higher recovery, but if he
had the court could have granted up to 401 weeks recovery for combined total and partial
incapacity. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 11 (1967).
94Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Snow, 114 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. Civ. App, 1938) error
dismissed; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. White, 97 S.W.2d 960, 962 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)
writ of error granted, dismissed by agreement; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 88 S.W.2d
543, 545-46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), re'd on other grounds, 117 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1938) adopted (the Commission of Appeals affirmed the finding of no conflict, using both
subjective and objective language, id. at 425); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Culvahouse, 10 S.W.2d
803, 805-07 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dismissed (compare the court's disclaimer on subjectivity with its analysis of the potential conflict).
'"Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Strawn, 44 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error ref.,
in which the court stated: "The finding of the jury that appellee was totally disabled [from
November 13th] necessarily carried with it the lesser finding that he was partially disabled
from November 13th."
"Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McLaughlin, 134 Tex. 613, 135 S.W.2d 955 (1940). The court
introduced the problem by stating: "We now come to the most difficult question in this
case, and he one on which this writ was granted." Id. at 957. However, the standard adopted
had been used by previous courts. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Olesky, 288 S.W. 244, 247 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926) error dismissed w.o.j. The following cases, cited previously, had indicated
acceptance of a "judgment test": Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 117 S.W.2d 423 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1938) adopted; Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Milliken, 110 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937).
"7 135 S.W.2d at 958.
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For over twenty-five years the McLaughlin rule was conclusive in the
area, and claimants were allowed recovery if they would accept the
minimum recoverable under the verdict." Only in one case, never cited
as authority by future cases (and which itself did not cite McLaughlin),
did pre-McLaughlin technical language appear." On the other hand, in
1965 one appellate court both cited McLaughlin and reverted to subjective language to support a finding of no fatal conflict when the jury had
found 200 weeks total incapacity and 200 weeks partial incapacity with
no wage earning capacity."° The case was reversed on other grounds, and
the supreme court's decision contains the following enigmatic line: "The
other points urged by Petitioner will doubtless not arise upon another
trial, and we will forego consideration of them."'01
The most recent statement in the area lends further doubt to the continued authority of the McLaughlin test. In 1965 in Insurance Co. of
North America v. Brown' 1 the Texas Supreme Court reviewed a verdict
awarding total incapacity for nine weeks and partial permanent incapacity
with no earning capacity. The court of civil appeals had affirmed the
trial court's award of recovery for nine weeks of total incapacity followed
by 300 weeks of partial incapacity.' (The amount of the weekly award
remained constant since recovery for partial incapacity was computed
with zero earning capacity during the injury.) The supreme court applied
a Bradford test to reverse, ' and indicated that irreconcilable conflict exists
whenever a defendant succeeds in limiting the period of total incapacity
in time but finds himself paying recovery after that time equal to the
recovery for total incapacity. The court did not seem concerned that the
total award included recovery for more than 300 weeks, the maximum
period allowable for partial incapacity.
The current vitality of the McLaughlin test might be subject to question in light of the summary treatment given it in Brown. The court
labeled the McLaughlin situation as a partial incapacity-total incapacity
conflict, therefore not controlling in the partial incapacity-total recovery
conflict present in Brown. The distinction falls flat by the objective test,
because in either case a claimant can choose an amount about which there
"Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Murphy, 158 F.2d 506, 506-08 (5th Cir. 1946); Houston
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brittian, 392 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) rev'd on other
grounds, 402 S.W.2d 509 (1966) (see notes 100 and 101 infra and accompanying text); Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 308 S.W.2d 174, 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e. Texas Gen.
Indem. Co. v. Villa, 297 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Foote, 139 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.
"'Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Block, 161 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). The jury
had awarded permanent total incapacity and 402 weeks of 80 per cent partial incapacity. Judge
Funderburk, writing for the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals, stated: "Fundamental error is
manifest from the record. . . . The two findings [total permanent and partial] being directly
in conflict, nullify each other."
"O'Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brittian, 392 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
.. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brittian, 402 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1966).
102394 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1965).
1'3 Insurance Co. of No. America v. Brown, 385 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
'04 3 9 4 S.W.2d at 788-89.
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is no conflict."' 5 But a sense of dejd vu compels reconsideration of the

Woods case,"° seemingly discarded after McLaughlin."' Perhaps the court
has weighed the value of the issues (similar to a "personal judgment"

test50s) and has given an award of zero earning capacity greater importance
in conflicting with partial incapacity through specificity than an award of
total incapacity. By this reasoning the jury has committed itself too clearly
for reconciliation devices. Moreover, in the simple partial-total conflict at
least the claimant must accept an award less than total.
III.

CURE AND PREVENTION OF CONFLICTS

Post-Conflict Remedies Texas law does not leave parties with incurably
conflicting findings. Conflicts which are discovered before the jury is
released may be called to their attention in writing for reconsideration.' 9
The judge, in his reconsideration instruction, must avoid either commenting on the evidence or informing the jury of the effect of their answers."'
To be absolutely safe, he may state merely, "Your findings to issues 5
and 11 conflict with each other." However, additional instructions, such
as the one following, have been allowed:
You are instructed that a person cannot be in law totally and partially disabled at the same time. If the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled
to labor, he could not be partially disabled to any extent for any period of
time; stating it another way (meaning the same thing) if the plaintiff was
partially disabled to any extent for any period of time he cannot be totally
disabled for that period of time."'
.. In Brown no combination of answers could give the claimant

less than

300 weeks of

recovery with zero earning capacity. The trial court awarded 309 weeks combined recovery.
As much as 401 weeks of combined recovery is permissible under TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
8306, § I1 (1967). See also Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Villa, 297 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956) error ref. n.r.e., where the court awarded 300 weeks at 100 per cent partial incapacity;
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Strawn, 44 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error ref., where
the court awarded seven weeks total followed by 300 weeks 50 per cent "partial permanent incapacity." On petition for rehearing to the supreme court the claimant in Brown waived his
rights to the nine weeks recovery for total incapacity.
...Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Woods, 103 S.W.2d 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). See notes
88-94 supra and accompanying text.
5"'As explained in text accompanying note 89 supra, no monetary conflict existed in the
Woods verdict. Under strict application of the McLaughlin rule, quoted in text accompanying
note 97 supra, the verdict would have been allowed to stand. Woods was distinguished the same
year by the same court of civil appeals. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text. It was
cited for authority only once, in a pre-McLaughlin case. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Milliken, 110
S.W.2d 108, 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
"'See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text, explaining the often greater importance
given to "specific," "ultimate," or "material" issues when in potential conflict with, respectively,
"general," "evidentiary," or "immaterial" issues.
'TEx.
R. Civ. P. 295. See also 3 McDoNALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE S 15.03, at 1265
(1950); 57 TEX. JUR. 2d Trial § 554 (1964).
"'°TEX. R. Civ. P. 272: "The judge shall so frame his charge as to distinctly separate questions
of law from questions of fact, and not therein comment on the weight of the evidence, . . ." Also
cf., Uehlinger v. State, 387 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.; Beck v.
Craven, 360 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Carlile, 161 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942) adopted,
cited in Pacific Indem. Co. v. Anderson, 350 S.W.2d 360, 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Cf., PEERY,
TEXAS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PROCEDURE

22

(1960),

adding one sentence

to the Carlile

instruction for purposes of the court's initial instructions. The case (the evidence point which
decided the case) is discussed in Ray, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Evidence, 21 Sw. L.J. 173,
179-80 (1967), and Akin, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Workman's Compensation, 21 Sw. L.J.
75, 80 (1967).
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As mentioned previously, if the conflict is not discovered until the
jury has been released or if the jury is unable to resolve its own conflict,
the judge must call a mistrial.11 Of course, inasmuch as justice suffers by
the delay, the judge may attempt to reconcile the conflict. On the other
hand, if the conflict is only questionably irreconcilable but the judge sees
the need for a verdict without conflict, to avoid even further delay by
appeal or mandamus, he may grant judgment on the verdict and then
grant a motion for a new trial. In this latter maneuver he has nearly
absolute authority."'
Pre-Conflict Precautions Even under the existing special issue system
many conflicts can be prevented by careful preparation of the charge.
At present, however, the standard charge on workmen's compensation
incapacity seems to invite conflict. Usually presented are separate issues
of total incapacity, partial incapacity, average weekly wages before the
injury, and average weekly wage earning capacity during incapacity. Not
only are relationships of such terms concealed from jurors, but also the
definitions of the terms are quite cumbersome."' The resulting confusion
often goes deeper than mere separation of fact questions from legal consequences, and, as mentioned before, the disease of confusion is not cured
merely by patching up the symptom of irreconcilable conflict in the
verdict.
Lawyers can aid the jury by presenting well-organized arguments and
by clarifying terms throughout the trial. In this respect effective utilization of the blackboard cannot be overemphasized.
Judges should also attempt to ease the juror's burden. For example,
the standard definition of "partial incapacity" seems both long and unnecessary-and thus confusing. A shorter form, recommended by a leading commentator"' and adopted by many courts," is certainly preferable.
The definition is as follows: "Any degree of incapacity to work, less than
total incapacity, as defined herein, whereby a person suffers a depreciation
or loss in his earning capacity."
Unfortunately, even though instructions in the charge are helpful in
preventing confusion, often the jury either does not read them carefully
or does not comprehend the concepts with precision. Three specific changes
". TEx. R. Civ. P. 295. Graham v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 165 S.W.2d 1002, 1006
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref., cited at Continental Nat'l Bank v. Hall-Page Tire Co., 318
S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). See also note 24 supra and accompanying text.
"'Hunsinger v. Boyd, 119 Tex. 182, 26 S.W.2d 907, 907-08 (1930); Spikes v. Smith, 386
S.W.2d 346, 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), and authority cited therein. Cf., Flato Bros., Inc. v.
McKinney, 399 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"" The Holland definition, approved by the supreme court, is quoted at note 81 supra.
Equally intricate and confusing are the Craik- definition (quoted in text accompanying note 81
supra) and the Stephenson definition (quoted at note 71 supra).
saPEERY, Op. cit. supra note 111, at 21.
"OAn excellent analysis with extensive case authority can be found in Liberty Universal Ins.

Co. v. Gill, 401 S.W.2d 339, 343-44 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. The Gill case was
followed in Highlands Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 410 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error
ref. n.r.e. Often the instruction quoted in text accompanying note 111 supra is added, as is the
sentence, "A person may be totally disabled for a period of time less than permanent and then
may thereafter be partially disabled." See PEERY, Op. cit. supra note 111, at 22.
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in standard special issue submission might curb conflicts and confusion.
First, one issue should be presented asking whether the claimant suffered
reduction of wage earning capacity. Secondly, partial incapacity and total
incapacity should be asked disjunctively. And thirdly, the amount of
recovery for partial incapacity should be submitted in one issue as the
reduction of wage earning capacity.
1. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, as a result of the injury, if any, suffered a reduction in wage
earning capacity?11
Answer "Yes" or "No."
Answer:

If your answer to special issue No. 1 was "Yes," and only if your
answer to that issue was "Yes," then you will answer special issue
No. 2.
2. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's reduction in wage earning capacity, if any, was total or
partial? If you find from a preponderance of the evidence the
answer to be total, then answer "Total." Otherwise answer "Partial."
Answer:
As mentioned previously, one cause of conflicts is the jurors' equating
"incapacity" with loss of physical ability rather than wage earning ability.
An issue questioning the loss of wage earning capacity, while not free
from confusion, at least states the problem more accurately than "total
incapacity" or "partial incapacity." The second cause of conflicts, considering the whole (total) to include all of its parts (partial), can be
cured by asking in one issue whether such loss of capacity was total or
partial. Although an issue on partial incapacity cannot be conditioned on
a negative answer to total incapacity," ' the two may be asked disjunctively
in the same issue."" Such a method of submission would reduce conflicts
and avoid placing implied emphasis on either alternative.
The proposed issues are not new. Rule 277 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure gives express approval to the disjunctive form of submission,
even mentioning as an example the permanent-temporary disjunctive
"" A

definition

of

"wage

earning capacity"

can

be

selected

from

the

following

two

recommendations:
Wage earning capacity means ability and fitness to work, considered in connection
with the opportunity to work. It does not necessarily mean the actual earnings, or
money, that one who suffers an injury is making during the time inquired about.
It refers to that which, by virtue of training, the experience, and the business acumen
possessed, an individual is capable of earning. (Judge Clarence A. Guittard, 14th
District Court, Dallas, Texas)
Wage earning capacity means that amount that the plaintiff can reasonably be
expected to regularly earn in some type of employment reasonably suitable to his
physical condition and ability to work, or the amount he can reasonably be expected
to regularly earn in a type of employment of a less remunerative class than he
performed prior to his injuries. (Judge Charles J. Murray, 17th District Court, Fort
Worth, Texas)
"' See discussion at note 53 supra.
"' TEx. R. Civ. P. 277. See also cases cited in notes 120-24 infra and accompanying text.
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issue in workmen's compensation cases."' In Southern Underwriters v.
5 a 1942
Schoolcraft,"'
Commission of Appeals decision adopted by the
Texas Supreme Court, the court held that disjunctive issues on partial
and total incapacity were admissible and that refusal to substitute or add
the traditional issues was not error. (The court also noted the trial court's
skill in allowing the jury to consider whether the claimant might be incapacitated totally for a definite period and partially thereafter."') A
civil appeals case decided the same year".. also accepted the disjunctive,
citing rule 277 but not the Schoolcraft case. Both the Schoolcraft decision
and rule 277 were cited by the only other appellate decision in which the
disjunctive issue was questioned."' Nevertheless, although the proposed
submission has received approval from cases and rule 277, it has not been
used extensively in workmen's compensation suits, and it has not been
recommended by the writers." Adherence to individual submissions of
total incapacity and partial incapacity may be attributable to (1) an
unjustifiable aversion to conditioning partial incapacity in any way,"
(2) a more justifiable fear that jurors will be hindered in finding temporary total incapacity followed by permanent partial incapacity," 7 (3)
fear by plaintiffs that juries, given a choice at the first, will never award
total, (4) fear by defendants that juries will award only total, and/or
(5) momentum of past practice."' Despite some validity in the second
justification, the benefits of disjunctive submission seem superior for juror
comprehension.
...The permanent-temporary

disjunctive

issue has

gained practically

universal

acceptance.

See PEERY, op. cit. supra note 111, at 30.
121 138 Tex. 323, 158 S.W.2d 991 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942) adopted. The court did not
cite rule 277, perhaps because the total-partial question was considered to have more than two
possible answers (an express restriction in the rule). For example, a claimant could be totally
incapacitated for a temporary period and then partially incapacitated thereafter.
".. 158 S.W.2d at 993.
"' Wickson v. Service Mutual Ins. Co., 163 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error
ref. w.o.m. Perhaps the court agreed so well with the reasoning in text accompanying note 123
supra that it felt such reasoning to be unnecessary and therefore anything other than rule 277
to be superfluous.
1"Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Little, 188 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), error ref. w.m.
The court attempted to distinguish Schoolcraft and rule 277 by stating (1) that Schoolcraft did
not face the disjunctive issue, and (2) that rule 277 followed and clarified Schoolcraft. Actually,
(1) the Schoolcraft decision did discuss the question of disjunctive even though the case was
not decided on that question, and (2) rule 277 was in existence prior to the Schoolcraft controversy. See commentary, 2 TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. 641 (1967). Cf., Employers' Reinsurance Corp.
v. Brantley, 173 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.
"25LIECK, LEGAL TRIAL AID 365-66 (2d rev. ed. 1959); PEERY, op. cit. supra note 111, at
34-35; STAYTON, TEXAS FORMS 360-61 (1962)
(prepared by Mr. Peery). But cf., HODGES,
SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS 77-78 (1959)
which gives approval to the disjunctive
(especially at note 22).
12 The following statement
in PEERY, Op. cit. supra note 111, at 35, seems unduly critical:
"The Stone case is authority for the conditional submission of this issue, but the writer recommends that the issue always be submitted unconditionally, as our appellate courts sometimes
lack the luster of the jewel of consistency." Moreover, a disjunctive submission need not rely
on the
7 Stone decision for its validity. See notes 118-23 supra and accompanying text.
"2 But see discussion in Southern Underwriters v. Schoolcraft, 138 Tex. 323, 158 S.W.2d 991,
992-93 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942) adopted. See also text accompanying note 122 supra.
12 LIECK, op. cit. supra note 125, at 365, states merely: "Now, if one wishes, he can submit
both total and partial in the same issue and it is proper, but the author does not deem it a satisfactory way, and prefers the single issue inquiring on each of these incapacities."
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3. What amount in dollars, if any, do you find to be the plaintiff's
average weekly reduction in wage earning capacity?
In answering the above issue, you will consider [your answer to
] [
(stipulated) ] 12 as representing
issue
his wage earning capacity before the injury.
The final issue in the series has not been tested in appellate courts, but
it does not seem to violate any rules set by either the legislature or the
courts. It does not measure recovery by percentages; it does place emphasis
on the claimant's reduction of earning capacity rather than on his present earnings. Whereas the standard issues present both seemingly unrelated issues and a wealth of confusing terms, companion issues of incapacity and reduction would keep jurors thinking along parallel lines
and thus avoid the wage-capacity confusion. In fact, the term "wages"
is not even needed because the amount either will be stipulated or will
be determined by the jury in a prior issue. The instruction seems proper
after Holland."
The above three special issues, providing the basis for a new charge

concerning partial incapacity, seem to alleviate much of the problems
that caused the Craik-Holland and Brown conflicts. In an area regulated
by statute in part to provide speedy remedies, it is ironic indeed that the
statute itself causes unnecessary delay. Moreover, if such conflicts are
merely symptoms of a more serious disease-juror confusion-cures should
be tested continually. If the traditional' issues are being honored mainly
because of their own momentum, perhaps a new look would be advantageous to jurors and lawyers alike.

129 If

an average weekly wage before the injury is stipulated, that dollar amount can be used.

If not, the amount will have been determined by an answer to a prior issue. In either case the
jury need only compare dollar amounts. It need not consider the term "wages" in determining
reduction in "wage earning capacity."
o If the remainder [from the statutory computation] is to represent extent of loss of
earning capacity, necessarily average weekly wages before injury must represent, in
law, earning capacity before injury.
Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 347 S.W.2d 605, 606 (1961). (Emphasis in original.)
See note 76 supra and accompanying text.

